WHAT CONSITUTES AN ELECTION AUDIT
|
Richard Hayes Phillips, Ph.D.
Presented at the Building a New World Conference
Radford, Virginia, May 24, 2008
What Ohio citizens conducted, under my direction, was a genuine audit
of the 2004 presidential election. This was no mere “spot check” of
randomly selected precincts, and no mere “recount” of the same ballots
previously run through the electronic tabulators.
We learned to ask for everything: ballots, poll books, voter signature
books, ballot accounting charts, packing slips, and invoices. We asked
to see all the ballots, whether voted, spoiled, or unused. And we always
asked to photograph the records, so that I could analyze them with
painstaking accuracy, and reexamine the same records when necessary.
We lacked the element of surprise, as a list of requested precincts was
almost always demanded in writing and well in advance. But I picked the
counties, and I picked the precincts, and I rarely said how or why.
“What are you looking for?” I was often asked. “I don’t know,” I would
reply. “This is an audit.”
When the IRS audits your tax returns, you don’t get to pick the year, or
decide which records to show them. They want to see everything. And so
did we.
When election results have been altered, this will almost always be
apparent at the precinct level. Either the numbers will be at variance
with long-established voting patterns, or inexplicable combinations of
choices will be attributed to the same voters on the same day, or both.
Voter turnout, that is, the percentage of registered voters casting
ballots, may be suspect, either too high or too low. The percentage of
ballots recorded as having no choice for the office, equal to undervotes
plus overvotes, may be anomalously high or low. Based upon these
criteria, we audited the most suspect precincts.
All of the records we requested are important. It is rightly the
responsibility of election officials to verify the accuracy of the
elections they administer.
The ballot accounting charts for each precinct should state the number
of ballots received at the start of the day, which should match the
number on the itemized packing slip from the printer who supplied the
county with all its ballots. That same chart should state the total
number of “voted” ballots, which should equal the number of names in
the poll book and the voter signature book. It should state the number
of “spoiled” ballots, which should match the number of altered ballot
stub numbers recorded in the voter signature book. And it should state
the number of “unused” ballots remaining at the end of the day, which,
when added to the number of “voted” and “spoiled” ballots, should equal
the total number of ballots received at the start of the day. Without
these records there is no way to tell if the ballot box contains too
many ballots, or too few.
Ballot stubs are numbered strips of paper attached to each ballot. The
stub number for each ballot issued, both “voted” and “spoiled,” should
be recorded by a poll worker right next to the voter’s name in both the
poll book, written by the poll worker, and the voter signature book,
signed by the voter. The ballot stub should be torn off and placed into
the ballot box separately, to protect voter privacy and the right to a
secret ballot. The numbers on the torn-off stubs should match the stub
numbers in the poll book and the voter signature book, and the numbers
on the stubs still attached to the unused ballots should not; and all
the stubs, and all the ballots, whether voted, spoiled, or unused,
should be preserved. Without these records there is no way to tell if
the ballots run through the electronic tabulator are the same ballots
issued to the voters.
In Ohio, Boards of Elections are at liberty to “remake” ballots at their
discretion, ostensibly so that the voter’s intent will be accurately
recorded by the electronic tabulator. In the counties we audited, the
number of “remakes” or “duplicates” ranged from a mere handful to more
than one percent of the total ballots cast in the entire county. The
original “spoiled” ballots which the “remakes” allegedly duplicate are
supposed to be preserved. We never saw any of them. Without these
records, there is no way to tell if the “remakes” are legitimate.
The subsets of regular, absentee, and provisional ballots in each
precinct are also supposed to match the corresponding numbers of names
recorded in the poll book and the voter signature book. If the books
do not indicate which absentee ballots were returned by the voters and
which were not, and which provisional ballots were approved and which
were not, another opportunity arises for alteration of the vote count.
The ballots for each precinct must be kept in the same sequence in which
the auditor found them. Failure to do so can compromise the evidence.
Long consecutive runs of ballots for one candidate or another are proof
of hand sorting, for which there might be no legitimate reason. Abrupt
changes in voting patterns partway through the stack of ballots may be
indicative of ballot tampering, especially if there is a marked increase
or decrease in “ticket splitting.” This is why “whole ballot analysis”
is essential. The combinations of choices attributed to individual
voters on each ballot must be examined, not merely the contest being
investigated.
Ballots from numerous counties must be examined. Unless this is done,
there is no frame of reference, and there is no way to tell if ballots
are counterfeit. Likewise, all the marks on the ballot must be examined,
to see if one or more of the marks are made by a different hand than the
others. Such forgeries can be a method for spoiling the ballot by
turning the voter’s choice into an “overvote,” or by turning an
“undervote” into a vote for the candidate desired by the election riggers.
One cannot overstate the importance of the chain of custody for the
ballots, as it is here that the opportunity for election rigging arises.
Lapses in the chain of custody after the ballots leave the polling place
on Election Night provide the opportunity for ballot tampering prior to
tabulation, in which case a subsequent hand count will nicely match the
tabulator count. Lapses in the chain of custody after the ballots are
tabulated provide the opportunity for ballot substitution in order to
get the ballots to match a rigged tabulator count. And the greater the
number of “extra” ballots ordered by the Board of Elections, above and
beyond what could possibly be needed to accommodate all the voters, the
greater the margin by which the vote count can be altered. All that is
needed to cover the tracks is to destroy the unwanted ballots and the
unused ballots, or to leave the “extra” ballots off the invoice and the
packing slip in the first place.
Despite the numerous methods of ballot tampering practiced in Ohio,
doing away with paper ballots is not the solution. Quite the contrary;
the fact that eighty-five percent of the votes in Ohio in the 2004
election were cast on paper is what made the fraud detectable in the
first place, whereas electronic voting with no paper record makes
election fraud undetectable. What made ballot alteration and ballot
substitution possible in Ohio were the breaks in the chain of custody;
and what allowed the 2004 election to withstand the initial court
challenge was the fact that investigators were not allowed to examine
the ballots until 2006.
The preconditions for any crime are motive, means, and opportunity.
In case of election fraud, the motive will always be provided by the
desire to win the official count, and the means will always be provided
by whatever voting method is used. The only way to prevent election
fraud is to prevent the opportunity.
In my judgment, based upon three years’ experience auditing a rigged
presidential election, the solution is this: paper ballots, counted by
hand, in full public view, at the polling place, on Election Night, no
matter how long it takes. In this way the counting takes place before
any chain of custody questions have arisen, which effectively prevents
the opportunity for wholesale election fraud associated with central
tabulation. If this seems old-fashioned, so be it. When one is on the
wrong path, a step backward is a step in the right direction.
Make them steal elections the old-fashioned way, by altering ballots,
destroying ballots, or stuffing the ballot boxes right at the polling
places, in precinct after precinct. This requires the collusion of
large numbers of poll workers, both Republican and Democrat, and runs
the risk of exposure at any polling place where we, the people, are
watching.
------------------------------------ -----------------------------------
Richard Hayes Phillips is the author of “Witness to a Crime: A Citizens’
Audit of an American Election,” the document of record for the stolen
2004 presidential election in Ohio. His is the only book based upon
analysis of actual forensic evidence, including 126,000 ballots, 127
poll books, and 141 voter signature books from 18 counties in Ohio.
"Witness to a Crime" is not available in stores. It can be obtained in
person, or by mail order, or through PayPal, at www.witnesstoacrime.com
| |